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CRIMINAL LAW CASE NOTES .IND CO.1I.MMENTS
not to pursue its request for disclosure to the
point of a contempt proceeding. 39
31 If a legislature were to adopt the view that the
informer's privilege should be extended to private
civic anti-crime groups on the bases that such action
is necessary to protect the identity of undercover
agents and to provide for the use of information
which cannot be confirmed, it is submitted that
only a qualified privilege should be granted. Bas-
ically, such a privilege would be one which would
allow these organizations to conceal the informer's
identity at their discretion; but if a court found the
disclosure to be essential in furtherance of the public
interest, it would have the power to compel such
a disclosure. See text at note 37 supra.
ABSTRACTS OF RECENT CASES
Pre-trial Bail Held Excessive Where Undue
Emphasis Placed on Invocation of Privilege
Against Self-incrimination--Pending deter-
mination of a petition for certiorari to the
United States Supreme Court, the petitioner
applied to the Court for an order to reduce his
pre-trial bail from $30,000 to $10,000. Peti-
tioner is under indictment for violation of the
"membership clause" of the Smith Act, 18
U.S.C. §2385, having been charged with
being a member of the Communist Party from
January, 1946 to November, 1954. The peti-
tioner had refused to answer any questions
upon arraignment relating to his activities
during a four year period, most of which was
included in the indictment. This refusal to
disclose any information was based on the
Fifth Amendment Privilege against self-
incrimination. The District Court fixed bail
at $30,000 and the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit affirmed the order, one member
dissenting. The $30,000 figure compares favor-
ably with pre-trial bail set in four other "mem-
bership" cases under the Smith Act, in which
bail ranged from $35,000 to $20,000. Since
bail had been made in all but one of these
cases, there had been no contest on the reason-
ableness of those figures. In a memorandum
opinion by Mr. Justice Harlan, sitting in
chambers, it was held that since there was a
substantial question as to whether the bail
affixed here offends the Eighth Amendment,
the bail will be reduced to $10,000. Note v.
United States, 100 L. Ed. 95 (U.S. Dec., 5,
1955).
The reversal was based on the finding that
the lower courts had placed undue emphasis
on the invocation of the Fifth Amendment
privilege. "No doubt," Mr. Justice Harlan
declared, "a defendant's past history and ac-
tivities are relevant circumstances to be con-
sidered in fixing proper bail. But it would seem
that in fixing bail, as in a criminal trial, an
unfavorable inference should not be drawn
from the mere fact that the Fifth Amendment
privilege has been invoked. Assuming that a
court when fixing bail can consider the ab-
sence of information concerning a defendant's
history, even though the absence results from
a valid claim of the privilege, that should be a
permissible consideration only to the extent
that it bears upon the risk that the defendant
will not be available for .rial. What weight
should be given it depends upon all the facts
and circumstances in the particular case."
The opinion concluded by noting that the
record of this case disclosed no special cir-
cumstances to justify the high bail. Mr.
Justice Harlan further rejected the argument
that the burden of proof to show lack of such
circumstances is on the petitioner, for to re-
quire this might rlquire waiver of the privilege
against self-incrimination in order to sustain
the burden.
Judgment of Mental Incapacity to Stand
Trial Remains Effective Until Subsequent
Hearing Finding to the Contrary Is Held:
Records and Communications of State Hos-
pital Are Hearsay and Their Admission Con-
stitutes Prejudicial Error-The defendant was
initially indicted for murder, but on the motion
of the county attorney a hearing was held under
the applicable Arizona statute, ARIZ. CODE
ANN. §44-1701 (Supp. 1952), which resulted
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in the determination that the defendant was
unable to understand the nature of the pro-
ceedings against him. An order committing
the defendant to the Arizona State Hospital
was entered; after three months the defendant
was discharged as competent to assist in his
defense, but another hearing under the above
section resulted in his being committed to the
hospital for an additional eleven months.
Following a discharge from this second com-
mitment no judicial redetermination of the
defendant's mental capacity was held before
trial of the cause, in which defendant was ad-
judged guilty and sentenced to life imprison-
ment. At the trial before the jury the defendant
entered a plea of not guilty by reason of in-
sanity at the time of the commission of the
offense. In rebuttal to this plea and over ob-
jection of the defense counsel the trial judge
admitted into evidence hospital records, pro-
gress reports, doctor's decisions and opinions
and recorded communications between the
defendant and his doctors, all having been
compiled while he was committed to the state
hospital. On appeal the defendant argued that
the failure to redetermine his mental capacity
to stand trial and the admission of the hospital
records constituted reversible error.
The Supreme Court of Arizona first held
that under the state statute it is mandatory
that a defendant once found to be unable to
understand the nature of the proceedings
against him be accorded another judicial
hearing to remove the continuing disability
with which the prior judgment has clothed
him. It is immaterial that the defendant does
not demand such a hearing for he cannot waive
this right to the second determination. On the
question of the alleged erroneous admission of
the hospital records and other documents,
the court said in a dictum that the statutory
privilege granted a patient as to communica-
tions to his doctor is not overridden by a
broad statute making admissible those public
records which are kept in accordance with
state requirements, absent a showing that they
are so kept. In the instant case there were no
specific state requirements that that the med-
ical officers or officials of the state hospital
keep the- patient's progress reports, results of
consultations, doctor's opinions and declara-
tions of the defendant to his doctors which
were admitted over objection. Furthermore,
the admission of these records was prejudicial
to defendant in that he was denied the right
to cross-examination and much of the matter
contained within the records was recorded
from hearsay. However, the court did not
rule on the question of whether general hos-
pital records which do fall within the public
records exception could be excluded by in-
voking the patient-physician privilege-al-
though it appears that such records had been
introduced in this case. State v. Stracuzzi,
289 P.2d 187 (Ariz. 1955).
Minor Appearing Before Juvenile Court Is
Entitled to Assistance of Counsel Under
Federal Constitution-A sixteen year old
youth had been committed to the local train-
ing school as a juvenile delinquent under the
Juvenile Court Act of the District of Colum-
bia. 34 STAT. 73 (1906), D.C. CODE, c. 960,
§ 11-901 et seq. (1951). The commitment was
for automobile theft, which is a crime if com-
mitted by an adult. At none of his appearances
before the Juvenile Court was the boy repre-
sented by counsel or advised of his right to
counsel. Shortly after his release from the
training school he was charged with a parole
violation. He then applied for a writ of habeas
corpus, contending that the sentence imposed
by the Juvenile Court was unconstitutional
because the court (lid not inform him of his
right to counsel, guaranteed to him by the
Sixth Amendment. The writ was granted,
the court holding that even though the Juvenile
Court is not a criminal court as such, neverthe-
less the Sixth Amendment requires that a juve-
nile defendant must be advised that he is
entitled to the "effective assistance of coun-
sel." In re Pof, 135 F. Supp. 224 (D.D.C.
1955).
The decision was based on the court's con-
clusion that although the Juvenile Court is
non-criminal in character and an adjudication
by it "is in no sense the counterpart of a con-
viction in a criminal court," its "ultimate
function.. . is to determine the guilt or inno-
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cence of the individual in order to make an
adjudication of whether he is a delinquent."
Furthermore, the court reasoned, the statute
was enacted to afford additional safeguards
for the benefit of the juvenile offender-not to
diminish the protection to which he was already
entitled. Since this was the purpose of the act,
it is unlikely that there was any legislative
intent to remove the right to advice and assist-
ance of counsel.
The court concluded from these arguments
that any deprivation of the right to advice
of counsel violates the Sixth Amendment and
constitutes a denial of due process. The statute
authorizing the Juvenile Court is not itself
unconstitutional for it does not take away the
right. But any failure to advise the juvenile
of his rights or any attempt to have him waive
his rights will be deemed a violation of the
Sixth Amendment and will constitute grounds
for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.
Prosecutor's Use of a "Rap Sheet" in
Cross-examination Constitutes Prejudicial Er-
ror-The defendant was convicted of first
degree murder which was later modified by the
trial court to second degree murder. During
the course of the trial the prosecution intro-
duced a lengthy pre-trial statement made by
the defendant to the prosecutor, which tended
to establish a deliberate intention upon the part
of the defendant to take the life of the dece-
dent. Taking the stand on his own behalf,
the defendant entered a plea of self-defense
and attempted to establish that he had com-
mitted the homicide while in a state of fear
and confusion. In order to bolster his credi-
bility in the minds of the jury the defendant
testified to a clean record prior to this occur-
rence. On cross-examination the prosecuting
attorney began his questioning by displaying a
sheet of paper which he contended had been
taken from the files of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation and which he stated showed that
a William Jones had been arrested on suspi-
cion of an offense some twenty years previous.
When the defendant disclaimed any knowl-
edge of such an occurrence the prosecutor
stated: "So the files of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation of the United States are in
error,. . .[i]n other words, you deny the rec-
ords of the F.B.I. are correct?" Upon objec-
tion by the defendant's counsel that this "rap
sheet" was not properly identified the prosecu-
tor stated that defense counsel well knew that
"these records are prepared from fingerprints."
On appeal the District Court of Appeals of
California, Third District, found that such
action by the prosecuting attorney constituted
prejudicial error. "We think we are compelled
to assume that this was a deliberate misrepre-
sentation in that the district attorney sought
to give, and no doubt did give, to the jury the
impression that defendant's fingerprints
matched those upon the documents he held
in his hand.... This episode was followed by
vigorous cross-examination based upon the
discrepancies between the direct testimony of
appellant and his statement.... It may well
have been that the effects of these conflicts
were greatly magnified by the misconduct of
which the district attorney had been guilty
at the beginning of cross-examination."
People v. Jones, 288 P. 2d 544 (Cal. App. 1955).
Failure to Establish Familiarity with Gen-
eral Reputation of a Witness in the Commun-
ity Does Not Constitute Basis for Exclusion
of Testimony-The defendant was indicted
and convicted of sodomy and convicting a
lewd and lascivious act upon a child. A witness
for the prosecution, the father of the rhild
involved, testified relative to the interfamily
conditions under which the principals lived.
Although the prosecution's case did not rest
on this testimony in any material degree, de-
fendant urged that the refusal of the trial court
to permit a showing of the witness' bad repu-
tation was prejudicial error since the entire
case was very weak. The testimony which was
excluded was given by the mother of both the
witness and the defendant and was to the
effect that the witness' general reputation for
truth and honesty was bad. However, she
stated that she did not know of his reputation
in the community at large, but only through
discussion with his fellow workmen and with
friends and other people who visited in their
home. On the basis that no familiarity with
the witness' general reputation in the com-
[Vol. 46
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munity at large was shown, the trial judge
ordered the opinion of the mother stricken
from the record. On appeal the court held
that the general rule that evidence of a bad
reputation for truth and veracity is properly
excluded where the reputation is confined to a
limited area or restricted group of people is
not "in line with modem conditions." A review
of cases and authorities showed that the trend
in recent years has been to permit reputation
testimony upon the showing that the witness
is familiar with the reputation of a person in a
distinct circle of people or in a given area
other than the community at large. The reason
given for this departure from precedent is that
increasing mobility has resulted in a growing
tendency to live in one area while spending a
great deal of time in another. Thus, a person
may have a general reputation of one sort in
the suburb in which he lives and another at
his place of business in the city. He may or
may not be known by his next door neighbor,
but he will be known by intimate friends who
call upon him in his home and those persons
with whom he works. Based on this analysis
the court concluded that the mother should
have been permitted to testify as to the bad
reputation of the witness in the community
as discussed by his fellow workers, and, in
addition, "that there was a like reputation
among his circle of friends and the people who
visited at their home." However, because the
witness' testimony was not material to the
state's case, the error was found to be harmless.
People v. Workman, 289 P.2d 514 (Cal. App.
1955).
Reversible Error to Exclude Evidence of
Supervening Bankruptcy in Prosecution for
Violation of "Bogus Check Law"-South
Carolina has a "bogus check" statute which
creates a presumption of fraudulent intent
upon the showing of a failure to pay check
within seven days after written notice of dis-
honor. After such a showing had been made
the defendant proffered evidence to show that
he had been adjudicated a bankrupt between
the date of issuance of the checks and the date
of written notice of dishonor. This offer was
denied and the evidence excluded, followed
by a conviction of the defendant. The Supreme
Court of Carolina, after noting that there
must be a showing of fraudulent intent to
support a conviction under the "bogus check"
law, held that "the fact of bankruptcy should
be admitted in evidence as tending to rebut"
the statutory presumption. State v. Sulton,
89 S.E. 2d 874 (S.C. 1955).
Indiana Criminal Sexual Psychopath Act:
Trial Judge Has Discretion to Deny Petition
by Defendant for Hearing-Indiana has an
act which relieves persons from punishment
under other criminal statutes upon a hearing
and adjudication that such person is a crimi-
nal sexual psychopath. IND. ANN. STAT. C.
124, §§9-3401-3412 (Burn's 1942 repl., Supp.
1954). The Act excepts insane or feebleminded
persons and those charged with murder, man-
slaughter or rape on a female child under the
age of twelve. A proceeding can be com-
menced as soon as a charge has been filed or
after a conviction or plea of guilty if no judg-
ment has been entered thereon. If the prosecu-
tion files the petition for determination the
trial court shall appoint two physicians to
make an examination and report to the court;
but if the accused files the petition, the court
may appoint the physicians. Should the court
find upon a hearing that the person is a crim-
inal sexual psychopath he is confined in state
mental hospital and cannot thereafter be tried
for the offense charged even upon discharge
from committment. An accused charged with
robbery entered pleas of not guilty and not
guilty by reason of insanity. Two physicians
were appointed by the court for an examination
as to his sanity; based on their findings that
the accused was a criminal sexual psychopath,
the accused filed an application for a hearing
under the criminal sexual psychopath act.
The trial judge denied the petition and an
appeal followed.
The Supreme Court of Indiana affirmed the
ruling of the trial judge, one member of the
Court concurring in the result on the ground
that the Act was unconstitutional. The major-
ity construed the purpose of the proceedings
under the Act as being designed to protect the
public against criminal sexual psychopathic
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persons regardless of criminal guilt by making
possible institutional treatment as opposed to
criminal punishment; the latter offering no
deterrent to a repetition of the offense upon
release. Reserving judgment on any constitu-
tional questions under the Act, the court ex-
amined similar statutes in Minnesota, Michi-
gan, Illinois and California. Drawing upon
the rationale of a California decision in an
analogous case, the court held that since the
criminal offense here charged is not sexual
offense, the accused is not entitled to a hearing
under the Act as a matter of right absent an
application by the prosecuting attorney.
Furthermore, since the Act clothes the trial
judge with discretion to deny an application
made by an accused, the exercise of this dis-
cretion is not reviewable unless there is a
"positive showing that fraud, prejudice or
some other capricious action influenced the
decision." State v. Criminal Court of Marion
County, 130 N.E. 2d 128 (Ind. 1955).
A dissenting judge argued that there was a
constitutional question presented by the Act
which was of sutlicient importance to compel
judicial recognition despite the fact that it
was not raised bv either of the parties. le
would have declared the Act unconstitutional
under the Indiana Constitution in that it
purports to give a court the power to grant a
pardon after conviction by permitting a hear-
ing after conviction on the original charge-
while the state constitution reserves the right
to pardon to the governor of the state. He
would also have found the Act unconstitutional
on the ground that it grants a privilege and
immunity to one defendant not granted on
equal terms to other defendants. Although lie
did not contest the reasonableness of the classi-
fication used in the Act, he argued that since
the prosecution was free to file a statement in
one case, but was not compelled to file a state-
ment in all cases, it was conceivable that one
sexual psychopath could be prosecuted while
another would not. This provision was also
felt to be in violation of equal protection of
laws under the 14th Amendment to the Federal
Constitution. Since the entire Act was con-
structed around the jurisdictional provisions
which he felt were unconstitutional, he would
have declared the entire act to be unconstitu-
tional and void and affirmed the trial judge on
that ground.
Bastardy: Instruction to Jury that Child Is
Likely to Become a Public Charge Held
Proper-The Supreme Court of Michigan
has ruled that it does not constitute error to
charge a jury in a bastardy proceeding that a
"child born out of lawful wedlock ... is likely
to become a public charge." On three occasions
the trial judge had charged the jury that one
question which it had to consider was whether
the child would have to be supported by the
state. The Michigan Supreme Court examined
the law in various other states and found that
Indiana, Ohio and Wisconsin condemn such a
charge; while Oklahoma and Kansas hold
that it is not prejudicial. In adopting the
latter view the court noted that it "is difficult
to understand how a case ... brought in the
name of the People could be presented to a
jury without some reference to the State's
interest because of the possibility or likelihood
of the child becoming a public charge." How-
ever, the court was careful to reaffirm the prin-
ciple that "[tihe sole question in-a bastardy
proceeding is whether the defendant is guilty
or not." People v,. Finks, 72 N.W. 2d 250
(Mich. 1955).
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